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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Stanley Phillip Sweet appeals from his conviction for domestic battery in the
presence of a minor child. Sweet challenges the district court's decision affirming two
magistrate court rulings: (1) the admission of statements Sweet made to a law enforcement
officer did not violate his Miranda 1 rights, and (2) judicial notice would not be taken of
two opinions and orders in a child custody case which contained statements regarding the
credibility of the victim.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
On October 1, 2016, Sweet was arrested and charged with domestic battery in the
presence of a minor child after he reportedly shoved his former girlfriend, Rebecca
Foreman, to the ground in the presence of a minor child at the Bonners Ferry High School
football field.

(R., pp.7-13.) Sweet, through counsel, filed a motion to suppress all

statements he made in response to interrogation by law enforcement after he was placed in
custody because he was not advised of his Miranda rights. (R., pp.32-40.)
Sweet also filed requests for the magistrate court to take judicial notice of two
opinion/orders in a child custody case involving Sweet and Ms. Foreman, the mother of his
child, to which the state filed objections. (R., pp.56-73, 78-79, 90-99.) Sweet requested
the court take judicial notice of the two opinions' statements that he claimed were findings
that Ms. Foreman was "deceptive and manipulative." (Suppression Tr., p.2, Ls.1-11.)
After a hearing on Sweet's motion to suppress and motion for judicial notice (see generally

1

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,444 (1966).
1

Suppression Tr.), the magistrate court denied both motions. (R., p.129; Suppression Tr.,
p.3, L.23-p.4, L.18; p.20, L.7-p.21, L.6.)
At trial, a jury convicted Sweet of domestic battery in the presence of a minor child.·
(R., pp.139, 167.) The magistrate court sentenced Sweet to 90 days jail with 80 days
suspended, and placed his on probation for two years. (R., p.196.) Sweet timely appealed
to the district court, which, after the submission of briefs and oral argument, affirmed the
magistrate court's rulings. (R., pp.210-12, 220-245, 255-261; see generally 8/31/17 Tr.)
Sweet timely appealed. (R., pp.264-267.)

2

ISSUE
Sweet states the issues on appeal as:
1. Did the magistrate err in denying Sweet's Motion to Suppress?
2. Did the magistrate err in denying Sweet's Motions to take judicial
notice?
(Appellant's Brief, p.9.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Sweet failed to show error in the district court's determination that his Miranda
rights were not violated?
2.
Has Sweet failed to show error in the district court's determination that it would
have been improper to take judicial notice of, and instruct the jury on, another court's stated
opinion of the victim's credibility?

3

ARGUMENT
I.
Sweet Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Determination That His
Miranda Rights Were Not Violated
A.

Introduction
The issue at the suppression hearing was narrowed down at the prodding of the

magistrate court and by the stipulation of the parties to whether, after arresting Sweet at
the football field and transporting him to the police station, Sergeant Cowell "interrogated"
Sweet without advising him of his Miranda rights. (Suppression Tr., p. 7, L.17 - p.8, L.
16.) Sergeant Cowell testified that he explained the charges to Sweet and then Sweet
volunteered statements. (Suppression Tr., p.8, L.8-p.9, L.8.) Sweet testified that Sergeant
Cowell asked him "what happened," and he responded that "Ms. Foreman pushed my
mother down and I ran across the track and told her to get away from my seventy-eight
year old mother and I ... removed her from where my mother was." (Suppression Tr.,
p.15, L.13-24 (ellipsis original).) The magistrate court made the crucial finding that
Sergeant Cowell's testimony that he did not ask Sweet any questions was more credible
than Sweet's testimony that the officer asked him "what happened," and denied the
suppression motion. (Suppression Tr., p.20, L.10-p.21, L.6.) The district court affirmed
that ruling. (R., pp.255-261.)
On appeal, Sweet contends that even if Sergeant Cowell did not ask Sweet "what
happened," by reading the citation to Sweet and explaining to him why he was charged and
Ms. Foreman was not, the officer engaged in the "functional equivalent" of interrogation
which resulted in Sweet's incriminating admission that he pushed (or "removed") Ms.
Foreman in defense of his mother. (Appellant's Brief, p.13.) Sweet's argument fails.

4

B.

Standard Of Review
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate appellate

capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's decision." State v.
DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing Losser v.
Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)). The appellate court "examine[s] the
magistrate record to determine whether there is substantial and competent evidence to
support the magistrate's findings of fact and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law
follow from those findings." Id.
"The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on
a motion to suppress is challenged, [this Court] accept[ s] the trial court's findings of fact
that are supported by substantial evidence, but [the Court] freely review the application of
constitutional principles to the facts as found." State v. Faith, 141 Idaho 728, 730, 117
P.3d 142, 144 (Ct. App. 2005).

C.

The Officer's Comments To Sweet Were Not The Functional Equivalent Of
Express Questioning
Warnings of certain rights must be provided before the police may engage in

custodial interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). For purposes of
Miranda, "interrogation" consists of "either express questioning or its functional

equivalent." Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-301 (1980). The "functional
equivalent" of express questioning includes "any words or actions on the part of the police
... that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response."
Id. at 301. "[S]ince the police surely cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable
results of their words or actions, the definition of interrogation can extend only to words
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or actions on the part of police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely
to elicit an incriminating response." Id. at 301-02 (emphasis original). Analysis of what
is the "functional equivalent" of express questioning "focuses primarily upon the
perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police." Id. See also State v.
Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 470-72, 272 P.3d 417, 442-44 (2010) (applying Innis to conclude
that statements to defendant's father, resulting in a dialogue between the father and the
defendant, were not interrogation).
As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated in United States v. LaPierre, 998 F.2d
1460, 1466 (9th Cir. 1993) (first alteration in the original)
In determining whether a suspect was being interrogated, the critical
inquiry is whether "[i]n light of both the context of the questioning and the
content of the question," United States v. Disla, 805 F .2d 1340, 1347 (9th
Cir.1986), the statements made by the officers were of the sort that "the
police should know [are] reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating
response .... " Rhode Islandv. Innis, 446 U.S. 291,301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1690,
64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). We will reverse the district court's determination
that [the appellant] was not being interrogated only if the determination is
clearly erroneous. United States v. Booth, 669 F.2d 1231, 1238 (9th
Cir.1981).
Here, the district court found that the statements made by Sergeant Cowell directed
at Sweet were reasonable and appropriate to inform him of the reason why he - not Ms.
Foreman - was being arrested. The court found that the statements directed at Sweet were
in line with being "an act attendant normally attendant to arrest and custody" (R., p.259),
rather than an interrogational line of questioning reasonably likely to evoke an
incriminating response.
The state relies upon and incorporates the district court's Opinion and Order on
Appeal (R., pp.255-260, attached as Appendix A), as if fully set forth herein, for its
response to Sweet's argument. Additionally the state makes the following argument.
6

Sweet contends on appeal:
During his conversation with Sweet at the jail, Officer Cowell did not
confine his statements to merely reading the citation to Sweet. Officer
Colwell testified at the suppression hearing that he not only explained to
Sweet what the charge was, but also 'why it was.' According to Officer
Cowell, he and Sweet also 'had some conversation regarding why [Officer
Cowell] had not arrested Ms. Foreman, and [Sweet] had some statements
thereafter.' Officer Colwell did not elaborate on what he told Sweet to
explain why Sweet was being charged and why Ms. Foreman was not.
However, Sweet's incriminating statements were made after and in
response to Officer Cowell's explanation of why Sweet was being charged
and why Ms. Foreman was not.
(Appellant's Brief, p.13 (emphasis and brackets original).) The above argument implies
that Sergeant Colwell's explanation of why Sweet was being charged, and Ms. Foreman
was not, was the starting point of their conversation. However, Sergeant Colwell testified:
I explained to him what the charge was, why it was. He had asked
me some questions - we had some conversation regarding why I had not
arrested Ms. Foreman and he had some statements thereafter ...
(Suppression Tr., p.8, Ls.17-20 (emphasis added).)
Sergeant Colwell's testimony indicates that Sweet began the conversation by
asking some questions about why he was charged instead of Ms. Foreman- and it makes
sense that such a question would have been raised by Sweet instead of Sergeant Colwell.
Moreover, Sweet himself testified that, apart from allegedly asking "what happened up
there," Sergeant Colwell did not ask him any questions. (Suppression Tr., p.15, Ls.12-13.)
Sweet has failed to show that the district court erred when it rejected the argument
that Officer Colwell's comments to him were either interrogation or its functional
equivalent. Idaho law requires that, at or near the time of an arrest, the accused be advised
of the arrest, the reason for it, and the authority to make it. LC. §§ 19-608, -609; I.C.R. 4.
Merely informing Sweet of the charges and answering his questions about why he was
being charged instead of Ms. Foreman does not make the officer's comments the functional
7

equivalent of interrogation.

The district court correctly concluded that Sweet's

incriminating statement was not the product of the functional equivalent of interrogation.

II.
Sweet Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Determination That It Would
Have Been Improper To Take Judicial Notice Of, And Instruct The Jury On, Another
Court's Stated Opinion Of The Victim's Credibility

A.

Introduction
The first document Sweet sought to be judicially noticed, from Boundary

Magistrate Court Case CV-2006-52, is entitled Memorandum Opinion and Order Re: Child
Custody, Support, and Misc. Issues (R., pp.58-73) and states: "Sweet argues in his posttrial brief that the court should find that Foreman is deceptive and manipulative. Again,
this is nothing new. Foreman has consistently been deceptive and manipulative throughout
this litigation" (id., p.64). The second document, from that same civil case but from a
different magistrate is entitled "Opinion on Partial New Trial." (R., pp.92-97.) That
opinion concludes that "Ms. Foreman certainly has an indifferent relationship with the
truth, exemplified on my record by her testimony[,]" and that the judge "associate[s]
[himself] with Judge Julian's observation that Ms. Foreman is deceptive and
manipulative." (R., pp.95-96.)
Sweet argues on appeal, as he did below, that because two opinions/orders by the
child custody court concluded that Ms. Foreman lacked credibility, those conclusions
constitute "adjudicative facts" which the magistrate court should have taken judicial notice
of. (Appellant's Brief, pp.15-18.) Although Sweet does not specifically argue that the
magistrate court should have instructed the jury about Ms. Foreman's lack of credibility,
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his trial counsel did make such a request. 2

(Appellant's Brief, pp.15-18.)

Sweet's

argument is incorrect because the magistrate judges' "opinions" of Ms. Foreman's
credibility are not adjudicative facts under I.R.E. 201. 3

B.

Standard of Review
Relevance of evidence is reviewed de novo, but other questions of admissibility of

evidence are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 264, 923
P.2d 966, 971 (1996); State v. Lamphere, 130 Idaho 630, 632, 945 P.2d 1, 3 (1997); State
v. McDonald, 131 Idaho 367, 956 P.2d 1314 (Ct. App. 1998). Whether the trial court
abused its discretion is reviewed under a three-pronged test:
(1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion;
(2) whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion
and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices
available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an
exercise of reason.

Sweet requested that the judicially noticed facts be converted into a jury instruction; trial
counsel argued at the suppression hearing:

2

Well if you take judicial notice of the fact that Ms. Foreman is
deceptive with the Court, we could have jury instructions that -- of course
for criminal that -- the jury could choose to take that notice of that fact or
not. If we take judicial notice of the fact that she has deceived the Court on
numerous occasions, there's no real need to publish those documents to the
jury Your Honor.
(Suppression Tr., p.3, Ls.18-22 (emphasis added).) By stating that the jury could "choose"
to accept the fact alleged (presumably that Ms. Foreman lacked credibility), Sweet's trial
counsel inadvertently admitted that the two civil court opinions were not adjudicatory facts
subject to judicial notice.
I.R.E. 201(b) states, "A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable
dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial
court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned."

3
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Swallow v. Emergency Medicine of Idaho, P.A., 138 Idaho 589, 592, 67 P.3d 68, 71
(2003).

C.

The District Court Correctly Ruled That Sweet's Motion For Judicial Notice Was
Properly Denied
For its response to Sweet's argument, the state relies upon the district court's

Opinion and Order on Appeal (R., pp.255-260, attached as Appendix A), as if fully set
forth herein, for its response to Sweet's argument.
Additionally, the district court correctly determined that "an instruction informing
the jury that Foreman was believed to be dishonest in other cases would be inappropriate
as it would be an impermissible comment from the court on a witness's truthfulness, a
matter which would be for jury to decide." (R., p.260.) Indeed, Sweet's request runs
counter to the well-settled principle that trial courts are generally prohibited from
commenting on the evidence - in this case, Ms. Foreman's credibility. To give a jury
instruction that Ms. Foreman was found to lack credibility would have clearly invaded the
jury's role in determining, in this instance, if she testified truthfully.
Testimony by a witness as to whether another witness is telling the truth is generally
prohibited. Reynolds v. State, 126 Idaho 24, 31,878 P.2d 198,205 (Ct. App. 1994); State
v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 852, 857, 810 P.2d 1138, 1143 (Ct. App. 1991). The basis of this
rule is the general proposition that for one witness to pass upon the credibility of another
would "usurp the jury's function." State v. Allen, 123 Idaho 880, 884, 853 P.2d 625, 629
(Ct. App. 1993) (quoting State v. Hester, 114 Idaho 688, 695-96, 760 P.2d 27, 34-35
(1988)). Testimony that vouches for the credibility of another witness therefore does not
assist the trier of fact, but instead usurps the role of the jury.

10

In State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999), Trevino argued that the
district court had erred in failing to grant him a hearing to attempt to establish the scientific
reliability of polygraph evidence pursuant to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). The Idaho Supreme Court pointed out that the United States
Supreme Court had held that admissibility of polygraph evidence was a matter of state law,
citing United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998). The district court did not abuse its
discretion under state law, the Court stated, when it "reasoned that the polygraph in this
case does not go to help the jury find facts but goes to substitute the jury's credibility
finding mechanism with physiological responses and their interpretation by psychologists"
and followed the precedent of State v. Fain, 116 Idaho 82, 774 P.2d 252 (1989). Trevino,
132 Idaho at 894, 980 P.2d at 558. The same reasoning is applicable here, where Sweet
sought to substitute the jury's role of determining the credibility of a witness, Ms. Foreman,
with the conclusions contained in two opinions/orders from a different court.
In addressing the authority of a judge to comment on the facts of a case, the United
States Supreme Court has stated:
This privilege of the judge to comment on the facts has its inherent
limitations. His discretion is not arbitrary and uncontrolled, but judicial, to
be exercised in conformity with the standards governing the judicial office.
In commenting upon testimony he may not assume the role of a witness.
He may analyze and dissect the evidence, but he may not either distort it or
add to it. His privilege of comment in order to give appropriate assistance
to the jury is too important to be left without safeguards against abuses. The
influence of the trial judge on the jury 'is necessarily and properly of great
weight' and 'his lightest word or intimation is received with deference, and
may prove controlling.' This court has accordingly emphasized the duty of
the trial judge to use great care that an expression of opinion upon the
evidence 'should be so given as not to mislead, and especially that it should
not be one-sided'; that 'deductions and theories not warranted by the
evidence should be studiously avoided.' Starr v. United States, 153 U.S.
614, 626, ... ; Hickory v. United States, 160 U.S. 408, 421-423, .... He
may not charge the jury 'upon a supposed or conjectural state of facts, of
11

which no evidence has been offered.' United States v. Breitling, 20 How.
252,254,255, 15 L.Ed. 900.
Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466,470 (1933).
In sum, Sweet has failed to show error in the district court's opinion that the two
civil court decisions, and specifically the assessments of Ms. Foreman's credibility in
relation to those cases, did not constitute "adjudicative facts" that are "not subject to
reasonable dispute" as required for judicial notice, and that the role of determining Ms.
Foreman's credibility should be left to the jury. I.R.E. 201(b)

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Sweet's judgment of conviction.
DATED this 29th day of May, 2018.

Isl John C. McKinney
JOHN C. McKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 29th day of May, 2018, served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an electronic copy
to:
J. LYNN BROOKS
Contract Public Defender
at the following email address: brookslawcda(a),roadrunner.com.

Isl John C. McKinney
JOHN C. McKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General
JCM/vr
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· · This matter is before the Court on appeal ofthe magistrate court's denial of Sv,•eet' s
ntQtfo1; to~press

and ~otiQns forjµdicial n.otice. The Cotufheard oral arguments on the matter

on August 3172017, The Respondent was represented by Bonners. Ferry City Attorney Andrak.ay
Pluid, The Appellant Vv'aS represented by MichaelWaldrup. The Court, having reviewed the
briefs submitted. bythe parties, having heard :arguments of counsel~ and being fully advised in the
matter11 hereby renders its 'decision.

FACTUAL~ACKGROl.IT\'D
On. October 1, 2016, Stanley Sweet was charged with one coont of Domestic. Battery ln

ihc· Presence of a .M'inor Child, The cl)a.rge stemmed from a physical altercation betWeen Sweet
and hls ex-girlfriend, Rebecca Foreman, at the Bonners Ferry High School football field. Officer
Willie Cowell of the Bonners Ferry Police Department was dispatched to the scene and after
interviewing
several
witne,sses, Cowell arrested Sweet and transported him to
.
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the Boundary CountyJail. After Sweet had been processed into theJail, Cowell served Sweet
with a citation for Domestic Battery in the Presence of a Minot Child and explained the charge to
him. During the~ ofthe conversation..Sweet-who lladnot been.read·h,is M'uandtright.s·-

made incrlroirumng statements; which the State chrlse to attempt to use as evidence.
Sweet filed m()tiotIS to suppress tho~ ·statements as well as a motion forjuciicial n.otiee to
be taken of previous court <.>pinions in which the respective judges had opined that Foreman had

been untmthfui. 1 These motions werearguea·in. front of the magistrate court on.December 15~
2016~i At the hearing. Sweet· asserted that Cowell had asked hhn i•·what happened up there.'?tt,

while .issuing the citati011,e .Prior to Sweet m~ tllefacrlininating statements. Cowell testified
,·

that he purposely did not ask Sweet ·allY questions regarding the mcident as he \\"!lS concerned

about a potential conflict that may arise· ifhe interrogated him.3 The w.gistrate courtt in denying

the motion to mppress, found tila:t Cowell's depictl.on of theooriversation with Sweetwas·more
credible and that no mtet.rogation. had. occurred.4 The magistrate also held that th~ prior court

opinions ~~ng.Foteman• s trutbfulness were not appropriate for judfoi~ notice and denied
Sweet's motions.$ Sweet was convicted atjury trial on. December 20;, 2016 and sentenced on
Janwry24, 2017. S\\.-eetfiled a notice ofappeal onMareh 6, 2017.
0

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The sumdard .of review of a suppression motion; is bifurcated. \Vhen S. decisioti Oll
a motion to suppress is challenged; the Court accepts the trial court's findings o-X
fa.ct that~ support-ed by substantial evidence. but freely r¢vi.ews the appll:cation
of constj,tu.tioo.al principles to the facts·as ·found.
·

State v. McNeely, 162 ldabo 413. 39% P3d 146, 147-48 (201 'J)(mtemal citations omitted).
1 These opinions w«e i ~ by !;\le Honorab~ Justin Julian and tbe H'.~-ab1e William HiUnlett. a-0th opinions
were issued in the civil custody case betwerm Sweet and forr;man.
2 Hearing b.ttd beii:n"e the Honorable Justin Jclian.
3 rr4tlscr(pt o[t';fr;tir;n to S1IJ)pnss H«ffing, at 9.

~ 1rQN(;rjpt, at 20,21.

' 1'.rCll:fSt:ripts,

at 3.

2
State v. s,.,~e,
'Oplnum. md Omer en App~

Oct 27 17 10:36a

J. Lynn Brooks. Attorney

12086650220

SEf'. 18.20!1 ll:l7AM

r~o. 5375 r.

ANALYSIS
On appeal Sweet assigns error to the magistrate cowt for: 1) denying his mQtion to

suppress; and 2) denying his motions for judicial. notice of the prior opmfons. 6
1~ Motion t<> Suppress

Swe.et asserts that it .was error for the magistrate to deny the motion to suppress as the
interaction between Cowell and S~t at the jail was tlie functional. equivak:nt of an
interrogation and Sweet had not been read his.Miranda rights, 7 To support this contention Sweet
~fws toth~ decisi!}n in State v. Salato, 137Idaho 260,41P.3d 763 (Idaho Ct.App. 2001). In

Salato, that Idaho Court of Appeals held:
· 1nterrogatlon is defined as ttot only express questioning- but also its functional
equivalent. The functiomii eqwvalentofinterrogation includes any words or
actions on the part of the police ( other ilia.11 those normally aitendant to arrest and
custody) that the police should know me reasonably likely to elicit an
incrim~ating response.

Id, ar267, 47 P.3d at 770.
· Sweet asserts that the magistrate failed to examine whether the Cowell should have
known that the conversation regarding the dtatiou would :!lave elicited an incriminating response
frocp. Sweet Sweet also contends that the magistrate failed to view this :mreraction through tbe
perspective of Sweet as required by Rhode lslandv. lnnis~ 446 U.S. 291, IOO S.Ct. 1682 (19S0).6

The Court sitting in its appellate capacity is constrained to accept the magistrate's
:findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. The magistrate found Cowell's assertions that
he dld not quesfion Sweet to he a more credible depiction of the conversation at the jait this
f...nding is not clearly erroneous therefore tbis Coun n:mst accept this as fact. Accordingly, fue
' 'Noiice ofAppeal, at 2,
8ri.?fofA.ppr;llant, at4,
8 Brief of the Appellant, at 4·6.
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Co'ttrt is conmained to only review whether GoweW s reading the citation and explailing the
c~~ to

Sweet am.owted to an inte);'l'ogati.on.

S.v..--ee.f s assertion that the magistrate court's analysis was in ~nflict '<Mth the holding in;
bmi: is misplaced. In Inn~ the United States Supreme Court ~ld:

We oonclude that the Mlranda safeguards ·come into play whenever a person irr
custody fa subjected to either expr~ questioning otits fµn,tional equivalent.
That is to say, the tenn ~":interrogation1 • unrler.Miranda :refers not ooly to express
questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than,
tnosenorm.ally attendant to arrest and: custody) that the police} should Im.ow are
reasonably likely to elicit ?n incriminating response from the suspect the latter·
portion of.ili.is definition focuses primarily u.ponth.e perceptions of the su:spt'zj,
rather ·man the intent of the poli¢ec. This focus reflects the fact that.
the !v.f~da safeguards were designed to vest a suspect in custc;;dy with rut added.
,m~ure of prot~tion against coercive pQlice practices~ without regard to .
objective proof of the underlying intent of the police. A practice that the police
should know is reai<m~ly likely:to evoke an incrlminatip.g response ftom a
suspect thus ampmrts to interrogation~ 'But. since the police surely @mot be lteid
accountable fo.t the unforeseeable results of their words or actions, the definition
of inte~ga.tion can ex~od aµlyto wc,rds or actions on. the part of pollce offieerS
that they shouid have known were reasormhly likely to elicit an incriminating
resp~.
Innis~ at 300-02, 100 S. Ct. ~t 1689-90 (emphasis in original).

· Whether or not Sweefperceived the interaction.wilh Cowell as an interrogatfon is
in·e.levant if the actions of Cowell are pot the funQtional:equhralent of an inten-ogatioit the Court

finds that Cowell' :r reading the ciiation and e~lammg the charges to Sweet was :not reasonably

likely to eHcit incrh.ni~respons.es. Whil~Idaho•s appellate courts have not specifically mled
on.whether ;:eading a citanwi orthe nature of the charges is functional equiyalento:fan
interrogation. the Tdah.o Cmtrt of Appeals has held that tbe reading tlf ail arrest wam.nt tQ a
suspect was not:.the:fu.nctional equivalent of an imerrogati.on. See State v. Pers,m, 140 Idaho 934
(Ct. App, 2004). Sw,,,..e;t m,:empts to diffe~ate Person from hls case as the officers who read
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Person bad b~n informed of the reason for his arrest Jn contrast, Sweet argues Cowell, wl10 was
the arresting officer, had already informed s. .,.eet of the reason for bis arrest and therefore the

latter reading of thf: citation was not normally atten.dant to arrest and custody. 9
While Cowell did inform Sweet that he was under arrest for Domestic Battery in the
Presence ofa Minor Child prior to transporting him to jait the Court is not persuaded that the

subsequent formal presentation of !he citatlon is, as a result, not im act normally attendant to
arrest and custody. \V},Jle the reading ofthe citation obviously "'struck. a responsive chord" whh

Swee1, it did not Ltobjective1y call foror solicit an iucriminati..Tig response" Id, at 940, 104 P.3d.
at 982. Therefore, the magistrate's decision denying Sweet's motion to suppress is affimted.

2. Judidai Notice
Sweet contends that it was error for th.e magistrate :o de..'ly the motions for judicial notice
of the prior opicions. til Sweet contends that I.RE. 201(d) required the :magistrate to take judicial

notlce of the opinions as Sv;eet specifically identified these opinions and supplied the Court as.
well as the Stat~ wi..!:h copies. Sweet asserts that the magistrate should have created an instruction

to present to the jury·reg~<iing the comments on Foreman's dish.onesty in those opinions, The
State argQes \hat the opinio;1s are not facts as conte1nplated by I.R.B. 201 as they are not
co11trolling or operatiw facts which are not subject to a reasonable dispute, 11

The magistrate gave a reasoned explanation in denying the motion to take judicial notice,

rufferentiatin.g the ultimate judgment issued ia the opinions from findings that Foreman. had
been untruthfuL The magistrate held these opinions were being offered in an attempt to

~ Briefcf Appellant,

at 1,
'° BriefofA.ppellar;t, at &.

11

Resporrder.t's Brief; at 9.
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improperly impeach Foreman and this information would not be rcle·vant or appropriate to

present to the jury. 12
The Court does not find the opinions Sweet seeks to enter to be appropriate for judicial
notice under LR.E. 201. LR.E. 20 l (b) states: A judicially noticed fact must be one not. subject ro
reasonable dispute in tl1at it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the
trial c-0urt or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose

accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. The Court fitidsthe State's argumentpersuasive that
the opinions of the magistrates regarding Foreman's truthfulness ru:e just that ~ opinions • not
fucts in and of $emsetves. These opinions were expressed in dccidi."lg unrelated cu$tody matters
and a determination tegarding.Foreroan·s µutbfitlness or, lack thereof. in courtwas not the
ultimate issue decided in the case. Further, an 'instruction iuformfu.g the jury that Foreman was
believed to be dishonest in other cases would be inappropriate as it would ·be an impennissib!e
comment from th_e court en a .vitness'$ truthful.ness1 a matter whlch would 'be for the jury to
deeide. Therefore 1 the magistq.ite' s decision. denying the motions for judicial notice is affirmed.

ORDER
IT rs HEREBY ORDERED the decision of the magistrate denying the motion to
suppress and the mcition to take judicial notice is AfFIRlvIED.

Dated this

11 Transcripts,

f f day of September 2017.

at3-4.
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